The ‘strategy of the Blue Angel’
On July 14, 1960, the Security Council passed a resolution in accordance with the wishes of the Congolese government, which asked Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of Congo and authorised the Secretary-General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, to provide technical military assistance to the Congolese government until Congolese armed forces are able to assume fully their responsibilities.
The United Nations in the Congo was thus created.
But instead of taking up the cause of the legitimate government of the country, the peacekeepers put the Congolese government on the same pedestal with the secessionist province of Katanga supported by Belgium.
In fact, the United Nations endorsed a neo-colonial situation in Katanga. Instead of maintaining peace and restoring order, the UN peacekeepers worked on the destabilisation of the Congolese government up to taking part in the assassination of the first Prime Minister of Congo, Patrice Emery Lumumba.
The 2 000 men of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was established in 1978 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon and restore “the sovereignty of the Lebanese state”, but did not prevent the country from slipping into violence.
In April 1994, while Rwanda was experiencing a series of events of extreme violence, the United States and Belgium demanded the outright withdrawal of peacekeepers of the United Nations Mission in the country.
Before the outcry from several countries, Uncle Sam threatened to veto any initiative to keep the UN force in the country of a thousand hills. The UN had just, by this act, condemned to death thousands of Rwandans.
Boutros-Ghali later stated that “the Rwandan genocide is 100 percent the responsibility of the US government”.
The hybrid United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur was established on July 31, 2007, after the adoption of Resolution 1769 of the Security Council.
Its mandate was to protect civilians, ensure the safety of humanitarian aid, monitor and verify the implementation of agreements, promote an inclusive political process, contribute to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law and to monitor the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. But the situation on the ground did not change, it even deteriorated.
In Cote d’Ivoire, peacekeepers of the United Nations Operation, instead of ensuring maintenance of peace, plunged the country into chaos.
Since 1999, 17 000 men of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) have been unable to ensure the safety of civilians in the eastern regions. Currently, there are violent clashes between the Congolese army and Rwandan elements of M23.
What is MONUSCO doing? It observes.
Meanwhile, men, women and children are massacred; hundreds of thousands are displaced, and the country is looted.
Congolese are outraged.
“In any case, I do not know what MONUSCO is doing,” says Nathalie interviewed by foreign media.
“They came to Congo during the war to protect Congolese, especially those in the east. Despite their presence, war is persistently occurring.
“Raping is ongoing, killings and displacement of populations,” she says.
“They do nothing to protect the population. I think they are there on a particular mission that people are not aware of.”
But what is the role of the UN peacekeepers?
In reality, not much if it is not to defend the interests of certain powers.
If MONUSCO is not more effective than were UNAMIR in Rwanda in 1994, UNIFIL in Lebanon in 1978 or UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire … it is simply because they do not want it to be.
We’re witnessing what General Bricmont has called the “Strategy of the Blue Angel”, that is to say, a comprehensive strategy of destabilisation which consists of pretending that you are taking care of an issue while in reality you are not doing anything about it.
Perhaps it should also be interesting to look into the motivations of these “peacekeepers,” and therefore even the origin of the (blue helmet) concept, while peacekeepers are perceived by the public as a necessity to end conflicts in the world.
In 1956, the Canadian Prime Minister Lester B Person, then President of the UN General Assembly, filed a resolution for the creation of an international emergency force precursor to the concept of blue berets and peacekeepers, making him the father of the international concept of peacekeeping.
The Nobel Peace Prize he received for the initiative clearly demonstrates the fact that the role of organisations like the UN and Commonwealth is to defend the interests of the West.
Through the UN peacekeepers, Western powers were enabled to act without raising the suspicions of the Soviets and other developing countries.
This explains to a great extent the incredible attitude of peacekeepers to the country of Lumumba.
MONUSCO has only further strengthened the hegemonic policy of powers that profit from the created chaos to continue plundering the DRC’s riches.
Peacekeepers do not prevent the massacres; they only count the dead and report.
“They are mercenaries of peace,” says a diplomat. “But they remain foremost mercenaries. They cannot be asked to go and get killed as soldiers defending their land or their country.”
The constant reference to the mythic and idealised form of “peacekeeping” merely serves to obscure the true role of these missions in areas of strategic importance; which missions are still used today in DRC to achieve ulterior objectives in the African Great Lakes region.
• Translated from French to English by Ambrose Nzeyimana and excerpted from the Rising Continent website